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Abstract: The objective of this study was to investigate whether formal and relational mechanisms of network governance act as substitutes or are complementary in their relationship with trust in the intermediation activity of real estate transactions. We conducted a quantitative study to test the hypotheses. We collected data via a survey and the context was Brazilian real estate business networks. We used a non-parametric approach to investigate the associations among the key variables indicated in the theory. The results confirm the hypothesis that formal and relational mechanisms of network governance act as complementary and reject the possibility of substitution between them. Both mechanisms are important to build trust-based relationships between actors, and formal governance mechanisms have a significant positive relationship with interorganisational trust, while relational mechanisms are positively associated with interpersonal trust. This study not only contributes to the discussion on governance mechanisms and their relationship with trust, but also broadens this debate by considering trust at different levels and in more complex structures where these relationships are still barely explored, such as is the case of business networks. 
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1	Introduction
Business networks have received increasing academic attention in recent years due to the relevance of such arrangements being identified as an organisational alternative in the pursuit of business competitiveness (Kohtamaki et al., 2008; Fallgatter et al., 2009; Sroka and Hittmár, 2013). Network performance has become the new competitive standard, as one network is compared with another, so the locus of competition moves from the rivalry between individual organisations to competition between networks (Provan et al., 2007; Majava et al., 2013).
Although it is possible for non-structured co-ordination networks to achieve positive results, earnings potential will only be fully achieved through governance mechanisms that enable a strategic alignment and coordination of efforts and investments in the network (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Capaldo, 2014). In this context, it is essential to broaden our understanding about the governance of these arrangements (Raab et al., 2013).
Several studies have identified the importance of trust when addressing the role of governance mechanisms in networks, and thus trust has significant impacts on network coordination and harmony (Julsrud, 2008; Rampersad et al., 2010). The literature on business networks consolidates the association between trust and performance (Sankowska, 2015) and includes a significant number of confirmatory empirical studies. 
There is an enduring research controversy between the perspectives of substitution and complementarity of formal and relational governance mechanisms (Petersen and Østergaard, 2018). The literature has witnessed a heated debate about whether trust and control exclude each other or complement each other (Manser et al., 2016). Some studies indicate that the adoption of formal governance mechanisms are associated with lower levels of trust, assuming that relational mechanisms act to replace formal mechanisms (Wang et al., 2011). However, more recent studies have observed that the relationship between the use of formal and relational governance mechanisms is not always one of replacement, but can involve complementarity (Czernek et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017).
In this study, we analysed the influence of the use of formal and relational mechanisms of network governance on trust. Our objective was to investigate whether these mechanisms act as substitutes or are complementary in their relationship with trust in networks. To achieve this goal, we conducted a survey in the context of the intermediation activity of real estate transactions in business networks developed in Brazil. 
From 2009 until the time we gathered the data for this research in 2012, there was a boom in real estate production and the Brazilian real estate credit sector (Alves et al., 2010; Hoher and Tatsch, 2011). This development reflected the increased competitiveness in the sector (Bianconi and Yoshino, 2012), leading to the search for alternative organisational models, among which business network integration stands out. In this context, trust is an important element for the intermediation activity of real estate transactions in horizontal networks, making this empirical context adherent and aligned with the objectives of this research.

1.1 The Real Estate Market in Brazil
In the last decade, real estate activity in Brazil has undergone considerable expansion (Boaventura et al., 2016). Policies for extending credit together with a reduction in interest rates and more financing facilities have intensified the real estate business in the country. According to the Brazilian Association of Real Estate Loans and Savings Companies, the country jumped from 61.1 thousand financed units in 2005 to 341.5 thousand units in 2015; that is, there was an increase of more than 450% in the space of 10 years. In monetary terms, in 2016 a total of 46.6 billion reais was allocated to construction and acquisition financing (Abecip, 2017).
This large-scale development of the real estate market led to changes in the activities of intermediation in selling and renting properties. The organisation of real estate activities, which was fragmented and basically composed of small-sized companies under family management and organisation, with little professionalization and all but absent integration mechanisms (Hoher and Tatsch, 2011), underwent a reconfiguration of its business models in the search for a more effective strategic positioning (Boaventura et al., 2016). 
To overcome the increase in competition, reduce costs, carry out maintenance, and capture new clients, many real estate companies chose to structure their businesses in networks (Lindenberg Filho, 2012). The tendency towards integration into real estate networks was observed by Alves et al. (2010) and Hoher and Tatsch (2011), who identified the potential for maximizing the competitiveness of real estate companies that operated via cooperative transactions. For example, partnerships known in the real estate business as “fifty” allowed partner real estate companies to divide the commission for an intermediation, making it possible to take better advantage of the client portfolios and properties of both (Boaventura et al., 2016).
Considering the potential earnings derived from acting in networks (Gulati et al., 2000), by choosing this configuration real estate companies can access a series of advantages, such as raising the level of commitment and responsibility of estate agents in their different activities, matching the services provided with clients’ needs, including new activities in the process of preparing properties for sale, establishing strong bonds of trust between estate agents, and making the work more dynamic and productive, with quicker responses to changes occurring in the market. 
Moving from isolated and independent operations towards acting in partnership with competitors breaks with the conventional bad habits of mistrust and requires the circulation of information about properties on offer to a larger number of estate agents (Lindenberg Filho, 2012). A network emerges from a group of organisations identifying similar problems and establishing common aims (Park, 1996). However, the continuity of cooperation is conditioned by its ability to achieve the proposed objectives and make its participants more competitive, and for this the network needs to be structured and properly governed (Zaccarelli et al, 2008). Governance is one of the key aspects for a network to develop and achieve its established aims (Dagnino et al., 2016).
According to data from Cofeci, the federal body that regulates real estate intermediation activities in Brazil, there are around 40,000 real estate agencies operating in the sector, revealing a high level of fragmentation in the activity. This universe ranges from networks organised by small real estate companies that group together, generally without any hierarchization and with geographically restricted operations, to international real estate franchise networks, introduced into the Brazilian market in recent years (Boaventura et al., 2016). According to these authors, it is also possible to verify the existence of networks with national coverage led by larger organisations often associated with financial institutions, which complement the real estate intermediation services by offering mortgage lending.   
As a result of the emergence of network arrangements in the real estate sector and considering the complexity of the transactions at the heart of these arrangements, real estate networks characterize a rewarding context for empirically validating the proposed hypotheses, and the current economic configuration of the activity makes it is possible to observe networks in different stages of evolution with different demands and governance structures.
2	Literature Review
2.1 Business Networks
The world economy currently features an extensive network of financial transactions, production sites, consumption, and labour markets, driven by flows of money, information, and business organisations (Wang et al., 2018). Integration into a business network gives partners increased market power and raises competitiveness, either by reducing costs that are now shared or by adding value to services (De Man, 2004; Leick, 2013; Sroka and Hitmar, 2013).
A network can be defined as a group of three or more legally independent organisations that work together to achieve, at the same time, their individual goals and collective group goals (Provan and Kenis, 2008). This is the definition adopted in this research. To understand business networks, it is necessary to understand the relationship among their member organisations (Majava et al., 2013). Academic research on business networks has highlighted two constructs as being essential to the competitiveness of these arrangements: network governance and trust (Moretti, 2017).  
2.2 Network Governance
The concept of governance takes different forms depending on the theoretical field in which it is developed. Two main areas can be highlighted: economic and sociological (Boaventura et al., 2016). From an economic point of view, governance can be defined as a tool used to re-establish order between the various agents in an incomplete contractual relationship, which undoes potential threats from conflict and enables common gains (Williamson, 1979; 1996). 
The concept derived from the Economic Theory of Transaction Cost focuses on formal mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding economic transactions; however, it does not cover all aspects of network governance, as it does not consider social relationships that permeate inter-relationships (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
In this regard, the sociological aspect of governance looks at it from the relational viewpoint, i.e., it considers organisations as being immersed in a social setting (Granovetter, 1985) characterized by interaction and trust between agents. Governance in inter-organisational exchanges goes beyond formal contracts, and involves repeated transactions carried out within the context of social relationships (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
With this in mind, other variables, particularly trust, are considered as influential when choosing a particular form of governance (Gulati et al., 2000). From the sociological viewpoint, co-ordination and control mechanisms are relational and based on trust and reputation, which are recognized as informal safeguards; violation of these implies the application of sanctions (Jones et al., 1997).
Despite the lack of an established theory on network governance, there is a convergent understanding that it is relevant to the performance of the network as a whole (Provan et al., 2007). Nevertheless, for Poppo and Zenger (2002), such performance can only be assured through the use and reconciliation of formal and relational mechanisms of governance. 
Despite the differences between the economic and social axes, studies such as Jones et al. (1997) and Das and Teng (1998) investigate the alternative connections between the two approaches, by combining elements of Transaction Cost Theory and Social Network Theory, leading to a more comprehensive approach to the theme of network governance.
According to Jones et al. (1997), network governance involves a select, persistent, and structured group of independent firms, focused on creating products and services based on implicit and open contracts, developed to adapt to environmental contingencies and coordinate and safeguard exchanges. These contracts are socially but not legally binding. Therefore, for the authors, network governance is related to coordination, which can be stipulated by relational mechanisms or bureaucratic structures and contractual relationships between the participating organisations (formal mechanisms).
2.2.1 Formal mechanisms of network governance
Formal mechanisms of network governance are instruments used by the network players involved in a transaction that can establish guarantees and safeguards on an ex-ante basis; that is, by anticipating possible contingencies and possible opportunistic behaviour that may occur (Williamson, 1979; 1996). Formal mechanisms involve the use of written contracts and other instruments such as statutes, rules, and regulations (Strätling et al., 2012).
Formal contracts can prevent opportunistic behaviour through two mechanisms: changing the structure of the costs of possible opportunistic behaviour by imposing a fine or penalty for noncompliance with a contract; and reducing the cost of monitoring by clearly specifying the parameters to be monitored (Lui and Ngo, 2004). 
Lower levels of trust lead to the adoption of contractual mechanisms for regulating relationships between business partners. However, when extensive controls are agreed upon, a sense of fear arises among participants, which could reduce the level of trust (Das and Teng, 1998). Very inflexible and detailed contracts can lead to difficulties in monitoring and adjustment, making it very expensive, which is why managers may prefer to replace them with trust-based relational mechanisms (Lui and Ngo, 2004). 
Although relational contracts are important for reducing transaction costs and maintaining the levels of trust between companies, the use of formal contracts can complement the existing level of trust in a relationship, maximizing the results obtained from it (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).
For this study, formal governance mechanisms are represented by contracts, statutes, legal rules, and regulations used in the governance of network transactions (Cao and Lumineau, 2015).

2.2.2 Relational mechanisms of network governance

Relational mechanisms of network governance refer to the mechanisms that act by imposing obligations, commitments, and expectations via non-formalized social processes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), and they produce superior cooperative results, whether due to lower transaction costs and adaptation, or through cooperative initiatives for creating value by sharing resources and investments (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer et al., 2018). The return would derive from relational rents obtained through lower monitoring and adaptation expenses, resulting in a greater propensity for cooperation (Vuorinen, 2009).
Relational mechanisms based on social controls enable reductions in transaction costs by replacing hierarchical structures and control with trust-based relationships. Furthermore, they encourage the strategic alignment of the participants, which is essential for the development of the network arrangement (Gulati et al., 2000; Provan and Kenis, 2008). 
The essence of social control is to induce behaviour through non-rigid measures, by sharing common goals, values, and norms. It is based on a process of player self-control, and relational mechanisms enable the development of trust via the evolution of the relationship, with the adoption of interdependence positions involving mutual vulnerability (Das and Teng, 1998). 
A good reputation makes it possible to increase the level of trust between the actors in a network (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer et al., 2018). The exchange of information regarding the reputation of companies is facilitated by sharing codes of conduct and values, maximizing the opportunities for value creation by means of relationships. The development of a common language and a specific code of industry norms reduce the difficulties of negotiation and transaction costs by allowing better coordination regarding expected levels of performance and the alignment of goals, which involves the social mechanism of macro-culture (Jones et al., 1997). 
Other social mechanisms include informal sanctions imposed on actors who violate the rules of the group, eliminating the implementation of regulations, and formal coercive, less flexible methods, such as laws, regulations, and contracts (Jones et al., 1997). There is also the use of the social mechanism of restricted access, in which central players in a network limit access to resources and more attractive transactions only to participants aligned with the central orientation of the network (Jones et al., 1997).
In this study, relational mechanisms of governance, also known as social mechanisms, stem from the social immersion of individuals and organisations in their network of relationships and include the use of reputation and socially collective sanctions in the network interactions (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).

2.3 Trust in networks: interpersonal and inter-organisational dimensions

The kinds of interaction that take place among the parts of a system characterize the network logic and properties of the system (Powell, 1990). Because these interactions are reciprocal, preferential, and mutually supportive, they result in trust, commonly taken to be the central coordination mechanism that is specific to and characteristic of network organisations (Tobias-Miersch, 2017).
Trust can be defined as one party in a vulnerable position in the exchange relationship believing that the other party will not, in good faith, exploit its vulnerabilities and cause it harm, thus configuring a kind of social adhesive (Van de Ven and Ring, 2008). In this regard, trust between organisations refers to the assurance that one partner will not exploit the vulnerability of the other (Gulati, 1998). 
The literature is accurate in recognizing the influence of trust on interpersonal and inter-organisational relationships and the development of business network competitiveness. Examples of this are recognized in studies by Zaheer et al. (1998), Dyer and Chu (2003), Gulati and Nickerson (2008), Gulati and Sytch (2008), Shamsuzzoha et al. (2012), and others.
Trust in relationships is a source of competitive advantage because it reduces opportunistic behaviour (Chekkai et al., 2013), leads to a more effective governance structure, and reduces conflicts between organisations (Julsrud, 2008) belonging to a particular network (Sankowska, 2015). 
In a multidimensional approach, Zaheer et al. (1998) distinguish between two different types of trust: interpersonal and inter-organisational. The interpersonal dimension refers to one individual’s trust in another. The inter-organisational dimension refers to the level of trust shared by the group of individuals in a given organisation in its relationship with the other organisations with which it carries out repeated transactions. It reflects institutionalized procedures that occur in the relationship between the organisations during successive transactions and interactions (Zaheer et al., 1998). In both dimensions, trust improves understanding between parties, reduces managing processes of cooperation, and improves quality, thus facilitating exchanges between parties (Sroka and Hittmár, 2013).

2.4 The relationship between governance mechanisms and trust

We present how the literature has addressed the relationship between governance mechanisms and trust below. As mentioned earlier, there is still no consensus about the behaviour of formal and relational governance mechanisms in relation to trust (Czernek et al., 2017). To illustrate the relationship between the variables, we developed four models from the arguments of Dyer and Singh (1998), Inkpen and Curral (2004), Poppo and Zenger (2002), and Lui and Ngo (2004).




In some cases, as Tobias-Miersch (2017) found, trust can explicitly be used to replace more traditional forms of control. In these cases, the use of relational mechanisms reinforces trust and acts as a substitute for the use of formal mechanisms in the network.
Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that non-formal relational mechanisms based on self-coordination enable the development of a more open attitude to value creation initiatives. Also, they save on the cost of more elaborate formal mechanisms, including drafting, monitoring, and enforcing contracts.
With their value creation initiatives and saving on transaction costs, the use of non-formal mechanisms of governance is associated with higher levels of trust, enabling the achievement of greater relational rent (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Figure 1 illustrates our interpretation of the authors’ view.

-------------------
INSERT HERE FIGURE 1
-------------------

As shown in Figure 1, relational mechanisms are associated with a higher level of trust and the achievement of greater relational rent. On the other hand, the use of formal mechanisms may reduce the level of trust and restrict relational rent. The relational view offers a useful theoretical lens through which researchers can examine and explore value creating links between organisations (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Pre-existing trust between business network members strongly influences the respective mode of governance chosen (Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). It makes the adoption of economic governance models involving lower costs possible, thus increasing the performance of transactions.
Considering that formal and relational mechanisms act as substitutes, Inkpen and Curral (2004) propose an evolutionary model to follow the evolution of trust and control mechanisms in strategic alliances. Figure 2 shows the interpretation of this model. A higher initial level of trust among the participants in an alliance would be associated with the choice of social control mechanisms. Likewise, a low level of initial trust would be associated with the adoption of formal mechanisms such as contracts to limit opportunistic behaviour by the parties.
From this perspective, the trust variable assumes a key role in the stability of the cooperative arrangement, as a drop in trust during transactions between participants would imply the adoption of formal controls, which, in turn, may cause a reduction in the development of trust, generating a systemic, self-perpetuating effect that may result in the termination of the alliance.

-------------------
INSERT HERE FIGURE 2
-------------------

For the authors,  the processes of learning and adaptation among firms feed the co-evolution of trust and control mechanisms. The learning variable can be associated with the relational dimension of trust, as Rousseau et al. (1998) propose.
Both Dyer and Singh (1998) and Inkpen and Curral (2004) report the existence of a positive association between relational mechanisms of network governance and trust, and a negative one between formal governance mechanisms and the level of inter-organisational trust. This enables us to develop our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Formal and relational mechanisms of governance act as substitutes in their relationship with trust.

The first hypothesis reflects the position of authors who have identified formal mechanisms as being substitutes for relational mechanisms. The possible associations between the following variables should be analysed:

	Relationship between formal mechanisms and relational mechanisms 
	Relationship between formal and relational mechanisms and trust

-------------------
INSERT HERE FIGURE 3
-------------------





From the complementary perspective, the initial level of trust enables informal governance mechanisms to act in the initial conformation of the business network. But as the network starts to include a larger number of partners, it needs to formalize the governance mechanisms in order to deal with the growing complexity of transactions between firms. This trend towards formalization is justified by the pursuit of coordination between the various partners, which now have clearer common goals and measurement parameters, which are non-existent in informal arrangements.
Formal contracts can complement relational governance mechanisms as the complexity of transactions rises (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), as seen in Figure 4. Customized contracts allow goals to be clearly outlined, reducing the scope of monitoring and imposing sanctions on opportunistic behaviour.

-------------------
INSERT HERE FIGURE 4
-------------------

The development of relational governance complements contractual safeguards, enabling the reduction of transaction costs and further development of trust. From this perspective, formal and relational governance mechanisms can have a complementary relationship, as opposed to previous studies that claim a substitutional relationship.
Going on to differentiate between formal and relational mechanisms of governance, Lui and Ngo (2004) identify different roles played by trust in terms of its dimensions of competence and good faith and the interaction with contractual safeguards in cooperative relationships. According to the model of these authors, formal contractual mechanisms play a moderating role in the relationship between the dimensions of trust and cooperative results.
Goodwill trust acts as a substitute for contractual safeguards, and competence trust acts as complementary, increasing the effects of the safeguards formalized between the parties (Lui and Ngo, 2004). Figure 5 illustrates our interpretation of the authors’argument.

-------------------
INSERT HERE FIGURE 5
-------------------

Therefore, as proposed, high levels of the competence trust dimension can be strengthened using formal contractual mechanisms, and we observe a positive association resulting in improved cooperative outcomes, with better results. Conversely, formal agreements do not contribute to goodwill trust.
In addition, Gulati (1998) identified a substitutional relationship between formal and relational mechanisms of governance, whereas Gulati and Nickerson (2008) presented a more complex relationship, indicating that the use of a certain level of formal mechanisms can complement the use of relational mechanisms. 
Poppo and Zenger (2002), Lui and Ngo (2004), and Gulati and Nickerson (2008) report the existence of a positive association between both governance mechanisms (relational and formal) and trust. Their findings allow us to develop our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Formal and relational mechanisms of governance act as complementary in their relationship with trust 

The second hypothesis reflects the position of a group of authors that identify the formal and relational mechanisms as being complementary. We analysed the possible associations between the following variables:

	Relationship between network governance (formal mechanisms + relational mechanisms) and trust 

-------------------
INSERT HERE FIGURE 6
-------------------





In this study, we adopted a descriptive and quantitative approach structured to answer the research questions proposed. We used a quantitative non-parametric approach to work on the solution to the research question by analysing the associations between the key variables identified in the theory, as detailed in this section.

3.1 Sample and data collection instrument

We conducted the survey in February and March of 2012, covering a sample of 35 real estate companies. These real estate companies were part of 11 business networks established in different regions of Brazil. The admission criterion for the participants was that they had to have performed at least one transaction in a partnership within a network in the six months prior to the field research. The research unit was thus the responding real estate agency, adequately represented by a manager in charge.

Specifically, with respect to the transactions in partnership, the respondents indicated which governance mechanisms they used and described their perceptions of the level of trust during the transaction. 
To gather the data, we developed a structured questionnaire and sent it to the managers of these real estate companies by email. For each real estate company, there was one single respondent for the survey. The questionnaires included indicators of the level of trust, as well as data regarding the use of formal and relational mechanisms in the governance of the transactions in partnership carried out in the networks surveyed.
The collection instrument included indicators on a Likert scale, which is why we tested the internal reliability of the constructs (Likert, 1932), obtaining, respectively, Cronbach’s alphas of 0.835 for the inter-organisational trust indicators, and 0.647 for the interpersonal trust indicators – which are considered to be good and acceptable, respectively, according to the literature (Cortina, 1993).

3.2 Research unit and variables

The research unit refers to the real estate companies and not the whole network. The identification of the use of formal and relational mechanisms of governance in networked transactions involved each one of the relationships established by the responding real estate company with the partner real estate company in the network, as outlined in Figure 7. The analysis considered the influence of the relationship between the real estate company and its client and the management of the network.

-------------------
INSERT HERE FIGURE 7
-------------------

We analysed each of these relationships to see if the governance of the transactions in partnership used formal mechanisms or relational mechanisms. The use of contracts (formal mechanisms) also included the differentiation between simple and detailed contracts. We collected data on the interpersonal and inter-organisational dimensions for the indicators comprising the trust construct. Figure 8 describes all the variables utilized in this study. We aggregated the data collected by means of the questionnaire by simply adding up the specific indicators for each variable.

-------------------
INSERT HERE FIGURE 8
-------------------

3.3 Procedures for data analysis

Based on the collected data, we performed the analysis procedures in two parts, as shown in Figure 9. 

-------------------
INSERT HERE FIGURE 9
-------------------

The next topic – Analysis of Results – describes the details of the methods used in the analysis. We consider each part of the research separately, due to the peculiarities of each one, in terms of the variables, metrics, and their relationships. Considering the sample size and the survey instrument, we employed non-parametric techniques to help in solving the research question. We used the SPSS statistical software and Excel to assist in analysing the results. 

4 Analysis of Results

4.1 Descriptive analysis of collected data

We sent the questionnaire to 209 real estate agencies in different areas in Brazil in order to obtain a sample of the reality in the country that was as representative as possible. The final sample is composed of 35 real estate agencies participating in 11 networks established in different Brazilian states. This number is enough to analyse the associations between the variables, since the significance test for the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is applicable for samples with more than ten observations (Best and Roberts, 1975).

4.2 Analysis of the relationship between mechanisms of network governance and trust

In the first part of this study, we analysed the correlations between the variables by identifying the Spearman’s coefficients and their confidence levels, which is an appropriate method for analysing non-parametric correlations between ordinal variables (Hair et al., 2006). 
The significance test for the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is applicable for samples with more than ten observations (n > 10) (Best and Roberts, 1975). When testing different sizes of samples to measure the Spearman’s non-parametric correlations, good results can be obtained in samples with 20 observations, with 95% confidence rates, which is a range commonly adopted in social studies (Bonett and Wright, 2000). 
Before analysing the relationship among the network governance mechanisms, we assessed the association between the two dimensions of trust. We based this decision on studies developed by Zaheer et al. (1998) and Lui and Ngo (2004), who indicate the importance of carrying out a specific analysis for each of the dimensions of trust (interpersonal trust versus inter-organisational trust).
We determined the trust variable using indicators of its interpersonal and inter-organisational dimensions, as indicated in the theory. To assess the internal reliability of the indicators, we used Cronbach’s alpha, since we collected the data by means of a questionnaire with a Likert scale, with trust levels indicated by the respondent’s perception.

-------------------
INSERT HERE TABLE 1
-------------------

Table 1 shows that both indicators have reasonable measures of internal reliability, which in addition to the development of indicators based on the underlying theory, ensures the reliability and validity of the measures used to construct trust. Analysing the association between the two dimensions of trust, we found the following results:

-------------------
INSERT HERE TABLE 2
-------------------

Table 2 shows that there is a significant non-parametric correlation at the 0.01 level between inter-organisational trust and interpersonal trust. This confirms the findings of Zaheer et al. (1998) by indicating that these two dimensions of trust have a strong association, but that we should not disregard their singularities, which the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients confirm.
We can deduce that in the real estate market, trust among the actors in the business network (inter-organisational trust) can be built from personal relationships. If someone who works in a real estate company has a relationship based on trust with someone else in another real estate company in the network, there is a greater chance of building an inter-organisational relationship also based on trust. 

4.2.1 Step 1: Analysis of the relationship between the use of formal mechanisms of network governance and the level of trust among participants

In the first step, we analysed the following possible associations between the variables that measured the use of formal mechanisms in the governance of network transactions and the inter-organisational and interpersonal dimensions of trust:

	Formal mechanisms and trust 
	Formal mechanisms and inter-organisational trust 
	Formal mechanisms and interpersonal trust 

We obtained the results shown in Table 3 by analysing the associations between the use of formal mechanisms of governance and trust. Analysing the relationship between formal mechanisms for network governance and trust, we observed strong evidence of an association at a 0.081 level of significance, with a non-parametric Spearman’s coefficient of 0.299. To better understand this result, we analysed the relationship between formal mechanisms for network governance and the interpersonal and inter-organisational dimensions of trust. 

-------------------
INSERT HERE TABLE 3
-------------------

We observed a significant association between formal mechanisms of network governance and the inter-organisational dimension of trust at the level of 0.016, with a Spearman’s coefficient of 0.403. This association is one of the most relevant to the study, both for the association level indicators and as a contribution to the study’s findings. These results are consistent with the possibility of adopting formal mechanisms to align expectations between parties and prevent opportunistic actions among the actors in a business network, thus enabling greater levels of trust.
On the other hand, there is no evidence of an association between the use of formal mechanisms of network governance and the interpersonal dimension of trust. This finding suggests that contracts and other formal mechanisms do not contribute to building trust among people from different real estate companies. In sum, in response to Step 1, only the inter-organisational dimension of formal mechanisms in real estate networks explains its significant positive influence on trust here.

4.2.2 Step 2: Analysis of the relationship between the use of relational mechanisms of network governance and the level of trust among participants

In the second step, we analysed the following associations between the variables that measured the use of relational mechanisms in the governance of network transactions and the inter-organisational and interpersonal dimensions of trust:

	Relational mechanisms and trust 
	Relational mechanisms and inter-organisational trust 
	Relational mechanisms and interpersonal trust 

We obtained the results shown in Table 4 by analysing the associations between the use of relational governance mechanisms and trust.
Analysing the association between relational mechanisms and trust, we noticed that there is only weak evidence of an association, because of the Spearman’s coefficient of 0.281. Moreover, the level of significance is only 0.102, which shows only weak evidence of this association. Going forward, we investigated the relationship between relational mechanisms of network governance and the interpersonal and inter-organisational dimensions of trust to help in understanding this result.

-------------------
INSERT HERE TABLE 4
-------------------

We verified that the association between inter-organisational trust and the use of relational mechanisms of network governance was not significant, even at the level of 0.25. This result is not consistent with the studies that directly associate the level of trust with the use of relational mechanisms of governance, such as those by Dyer and Singh (1998) and Gulati (1998).
However, we observed a significant positive association while analysing the non-parametric correlation between the use of relational mechanisms of network governance and the interpersonal dimension of trust. This result explains that the positive relationship between the mechanisms of relational governance and trust comes only through strong evidence of an association with the interpersonal dimension. In other words, in contrast to the inhibiting effect of contracts in interpersonal relationships, commitments and expectations through non-formalized social processes contribute to building this dimension of trust.
In response to Step 2, we concluded that the influence of relational governance mechanisms occurs mainly in the interpersonal dimension of trust. This result does not contradict common sense and confirms the theory (Gulati and Sytch, 2008), such as the influence of familiarity, since people who have known each other for some time are expected to cease using formal mechanisms to govern this relationship.

4.2.3 Development of the hypothesis tests

In the second part of this study, we analysed the relationships between the variables that measure the use of relational and formal mechanisms in the governance of networked transactions and their association with the observed level of trust. As the research question intends to differentiate between two opposing theoretical models, we divided this part of the analysis into two in order to contemplate the two hypotheses developed in the previous section.
To analyse the hypotheses, we calculated the non-parametric Spearman correlation coefficients between the variables and their significance levels. The decision to reject or accept each hypothesis as valid depends on the adherence between the observed results and expected results formulated from the theory that matches each hypothesis.

H1. Formal and relational mechanisms of governance act as substitutes in their relationship with trust.

To measure the validity of this hypothesis we analysed the possible association between the following variables:

	Formal mechanisms and relational mechanisms and trust 
	Formal mechanisms and relational mechanisms

Accepting this hypothesis implies a negative association between the variables.

H2. Formal and relational mechanisms of governance act as complementary in their relationship with trust. 

To measure the validity of this hypothesis we analysed the possible association between the following variables:

	Governance (formal and relational mechanisms) and trust
	Governance (formal and relational mechanisms) and inter-organisational trust 

Accepting this hypothesis implies a positive association between the variables.

In this section we tested the two alternative hypotheses, H1 and H2. We compared the expected associations that support the hypotheses with the associations observed in the sample, thus determining if the hypothesis considered is valid and adherent to the obtained results. 

H1. Formal and relational mechanisms of governance act as substitutes in their relationship with trust.

If formal and relational mechanisms were substitutes, as expressed in H1, we would expect a significant negative association between these variables.  Table 5 shows that we did not verify this in the sample studied.

-------------------
INSERT HERE TABLE 5
-------------------

It also shows the relationship between the use of formal and relational mechanisms of network governance and trust. To accept H1, the Spearman’s coefficients observed for the associations should be negative and significant, which is not the case. The Spearman’s coefficient indicates a lack of association in the proportional relationship between the use of formal and relational mechanisms and the level of trust, since the correlation coefficient is only -0.008 with a significance level close to one, indicating no association between these variables.
Finally, we also failed to verify the association between formal and relational mechanisms and inter-organisational trust. These results are not consistent with the argument of Lui and Ngo (2004) that there is a great mix between formal and relational mechanisms for a particular industry, due to the discriminating effect resulting from transaction costs. The absence of an optimal mix may be a feature of the specific sector analysed, which is highly fragmented, or even a reflection of the emergence of a network arrangement in the sector, which has not yet been consolidated. 

H2. Formal and relational mechanisms of governance act as complementary in their relationship with trust. 

To accept H2 as valid, the Spearman’s coefficients observed in the associations between network governance and trust should be positive and significant. As we are analysing business networks, the associations between network governance and inter-organisational trust are especially important.

-------------------
INSERT HERE TABLE 6
-------------------

Table 6 shows a non-parametric Spearman’s correlation coefficient of 0.329, with a significance level of 0.053, close to the 95% confidence level, which is the range commonly accepted in studies of social phenomena (Hair et al., 2006). Therefore, there is positive evidence of an association between greater use of transaction governance mechanisms and a higher level of trust.
Isolating the inter-organisational dimension of trust, we obtained a Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficient of 0.351, with a significance level of 0.039, indicating a significant association between greater use of network governance and a higher level of inter-organisational trust.




In this study, we analysed the influence of the use of formal and relational mechanisms of network governance on trust. The objective was to investigate whether these mechanisms act as substitutes or are complementary in their relationship with trust in a network. To achieve this goal, we conducted a survey in the context of the real estate market in Brazil, covering 35 companies from various parts of the country. 
By analysing the relationship between mechanisms of network governance and trust, we were able to observe that in the Brazilian real estate industry, trust among the actors in a business network can be built through personal relationships. If someone who works in a real estate company has a relationship based on trust with someone else in another real estate company in a network, there is a greater chance of building an inter-organisational relationship also based on trust. In this market, the influence of relational governance mechanisms occurs mainly in the interpersonal dimension of trust. On the other hand, this interpersonal dimension of trust is not associated with the use of formal mechanisms of network governance.
After conducting the tests, we rejected the hypothesis that formal and relational mechanisms of governance act as substitutes in their relationship with trust. On the other hand, we found evidence that agreed with the hypothesis that formal and relational mechanisms of governance act as complementary in their relationship with trust in the real estate market in Brazil.
The recent reconfiguration of the business models of the companies in the sector, which was previously fragmented and barely professionalized, has led to real estate activities adopting a more effective strategic positioning and beginning to organise into networks. In these networks, trust plays a key role, facilitating relationships between actors.
This paper corroborates recent studies that point out that formal and relational mechanisms of network governance are both important for building relationships among actors based on trust. The Brazilian real estate market is an example of the fact that informal relationships, such as those based on interpersonal relationships, are very important for building trust in a network, but formal relationships such as those established by contracts also reinforce this trust. As a network tends to become denser over the years, informal control alone can become confused, inefficient, and act against trust. This is one reason why the mechanisms act as complementary in this relationship, and so this study contributes to a better understanding of these relationships.
The context of this research was restricted to real estate brokerage activities in real estate networks, which are characterized as horizontal networks. Thus, the results of the analysis cannot be generalized for other sectors, especially in contexts involving vertical networks, where the interdependence of the activities developed by the participants can be higher. Moreover, although we made efforts to compose a sample that is similar to the universe studied, this sample was not probabilistic, but for convenience, which constitutes one limitation of this study. So, any generalization of the results is restricted.
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Figure 8 Variables utilized in this study

Variable	Description
Network Governance 	Expresses the perception of the respondent regarding the Governance of the network identified in the transaction in partnership. Corresponds to the sum of the Formal and Relational Mechanisms of Governance.
Formal Mechanisms 	Identifies the use of Formal Mechanisms in the Governance of the transaction in partnership between the respondent real estate agent and the other agent participating in the transaction 
Relational Mechanisms 	Identifies the use of Relational Mechanisms in the Governance of the transaction in partnership between the respondent real estate agent and the other agent participating in the transaction  
Trust 	Expresses the perception of the respondent about the level of Trust identified during the transaction in partnership
Inter-organisational Trust 	It refers to the Trust perceived by the respondent in relation to real estate partner in the network with whom the transaction was carried out in partnership









Table 1 Cronbach's Alpha





Table 2 Association between the two dimensions of trust















Table 3 Relationship between formal mechanisms of network governance and trust

Results	Sig. (2-tailed)	Spearman’s Coefficient	Associations analysed
Evidence of positive association	0.081	0.299	Formal Mechanisms X Trust
Significant positive association	0.016	0.403	Formal Mechanisms X Inter-Organisational Trust
No evidence of association	0.559	0.102	Formal Mechanisms X Interpersonal Trust


Table 4 Relationship between the use of relational mechanisms of network governance and trust

Results	Sig. (2-tailed)	Spearman’s Coefficient	Associations analysed
Evidence of weak positive association	0.102	0.281	Relational Mechanisms X Trust 
No evidence of association	0.261	0.195	Relational Mechanisms X Inter-Organisational Trust 
Significant positive association	0.094	0.288	Relational Mechanisms X Interpersonal Trust 


Table 5 Formal and relational mechanisms as substitutes

Results	Significance	Spearman’s Coefficient	Associations analysed
No evidence of association	0.365	0.158	Formal Mechanisms X Relational Mechanisms 
No evidence of association	0.963	-0.008	Formal Mechanisms and Relational Mechanisms X Trust
No evidence of association	0.429	0.138	Formal Mechanisms and Relational Mechanisms X Inter-Organisational Trust

Table 6 Formal and Relational Mechanisms as complementary in their relationship with Trust

Results	Sig.(2-tailed)	Spearman’s Coefficient	Associations analysed
Strong evidence of association	0.053	0.329	Network Governance X Trust






































































































































First Part - Analyse the relationship between mechanisms of network governance and trust

Second Part - Carry out the Hypothesis Tests

Step 1 - Analyse the relationship between the use of formal mechanisms of network governance and the level of trust among participants.

Step 2 - Analyse the relationship between the use of relational mechanisms of network governance and the level of trust among participants. 


H1: Formal and relational mechanisms of governance act as substitutes in their relationship with trust.
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